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…every entry into the sphere of meaning is accomplished only through the gates of 
the chronotope.  (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 258) 
 
This collection on developmental themes contributes to a spate of recent books on the 
dialogical self (e.g., Aveling et al., 2010; Hermans & Gieser, in press; Hermans & 
Hermans-Konopka, 2010). Their emergence confirms the growing importance of 
‘dialogism’ for psychology and the social sciences (Holquist, 2002). In psychological 
traditions, ‘dialogical self theory’ (DST) has multiple roots: first, in the pragmatism of 
William James’ (1890) notion of an extended (social) self; second, in the social 
psychology of George Herbert Mead’s (1934) focus on ‘otherness’ as a source of self-
reflection; and third (and above all), in an engagement with the concepts of ‘dialogue’, 
‘polyphony’, ‘multi-voicedness’ and ‘mediation’ emerging in the Russian work of 
Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1990) and Vygotsky (1978). Bakhtin’s dialogical epistemology, in 
particular, has made possible new linkages from literary and social theory to 
psychological studies of a more pluralist and relational self than the ‘self-contained’ one 
proposed by Enlightenment individualism (Sampson, 1985). The growing literature 
spawned by these linkages suggests that the dialogical approach is an important new 
innovation. At the cultural level, postmodern shifts in the possibilities for the self brought 
about by global electronic communication and by mass migrations, converge with these 
recent innovations. In short, more challenging theoretical frameworks are demanded for 
the study of the self; frameworks which reach beyond traditional Western conceptions of 
integration, self-containment and sovereign agency (Gergen, 1991).   
 I will begin here by outlining and summarizing the basic premises of DST as these 
are currently understood (see also Hermans & Gieser, 2011; Hermans & Hermans-
Konopka, 2010). Then I will introduce Bakhtin’s neglected concept of ‘chronotope’. The 




development and change in the dialogical self. These principles are then illustrated in a 
case study.   
 
Dialogical Self Theory 
 The driving metaphors of DST are fundamentally spatial. First, that the self is 
better conceptualized in dialogical terms as a conversation between positioned speakers,  
and second, that the self functions something like a society of mind, with all the attendant 
coalitions and animosities that emerge in any society (Hermans, 2002). The key 
innovation in DST is to propose that the self is extended in space through processes of 
positioning (e.g., Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Raggatt, 2007, 2008, 2011). Rather than 
being construed as a central executive or omniscient author, the dialogical self is 
understood to be an extended ‘position repertoire’ (Hermans, 2001a). Fundamental to 
this repertoire are the concepts of ‘I-position’ and ‘counter-position’, which set up the 
grounds for extension and multiplicity (or ‘decentralization’) in the self. When the ‘I’ 
takes up a position in the world a range of potential counter-positions are also invoked 
or made possible. These positions can be either internal or external to the self. Hence, the 
extended repertoire may contain a variety of interacting internal positions (e.g., I as 
optimist, I as victim), external positions (e.g., the imagined voice of my mother), and 
outside positions (e.g., interlocutors, significant others). 
 In the wake of the spatial metaphor that drives this approach to the self, the 
temporal dimension has received relatively less attention in the literature (Barresi, 2011, 
Raggatt, 2006). As a consequence questions about development in the dialogical self 
beyond infancy have also been relatively neglected. This is an important omission 
because Bakhtin (1981) was at pains in his work to place great importance on the 
combination of time and space in human experience (Holquist, 2002). Bahktin’s concept 




time-space relations as a means to understand human development. I will argue here that 
chronotopes can be used to understand the historical unfolding of positions and counter-
positions in the dialogical self as these emerge in time-space.  
 In this chapter I will use an adaptation of Bahktin’s basic conceptualization – I will 
call it the ‘personal chronotope’ – to consider questions about the emergence of the 
dialogical self over time and into adult life. If I-positions and counter-positions emerge in 
time-space, how can this process be theorised and observed? I tackle this problem first 
by asking the question: What would the structure of a personal chronotope look like? 
The answer I propose is that chronotopes are formed in a process of ‘third-term’ 
mediation between positions and counter-positions that are ‘threaded’ across time-space. 
The basic constituent of the personal chronotope is a triad defined by an I-position, a 
counter I-position, and a third term ‘interpretant’ (Peirce, 1931-1955). Interpretants, 
such as significant persons, objects, ideas, or events, serve an important function in the 
development of the dialogical self because of their structurally ambiguous meaning 
value. Ambiguous ‘thirds’ simultaneously mediate both integration and differentiation 
across positions and counter-positions in the self.  
 Using this triadic formulation, the personal chronotope is conceptualized as a 
plaited semiotic chain or ‘meaning thread’ of multiple triads, involving the same two 
positions and a sequence of ambiguous thirds. The personal chronotope has both 
temporal extension (a succession of happenings in story form), and spatial extension (a 
simultaneity of positions, counter-positions, and ambiguous thirds).   
 
Chronotopes in Physics, Biology and Literary Theory 
In what follows I first elaborate the concept of chronotope, beginning with Bakhtin’s 
original ideas. In the second part of the chapter I will illustrate the developmental 




chronotope. With reference to the novel he defines the chronotope as the “intrinsic 
connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed…” 
(1981, p. 84). In the literary chronotope, he continues:  
spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought out, concrete 
whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, 
space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot, and history. 
This intersection of axes and fusion of indicators characterizes the artistic chronotope. 
(p. 84)  
 
In his historical analysis of the genesis of the novel, Bakhtin traces the development of a 
series of literary chronotopes that are characterized by the gradual emergence, in modern 
forms, of the story of an individual responding to real historical events [the ‘modern’ 
(auto)biographical account]. In the early Greek forms of what became the novel, Bakhtin 
observes, there is no ‘emergence’ – the image of the hero lacks development and there is 
no sense of ‘placement’ in historical time-space. Only in the much later modern novels of 
‘historical emergence’ is real historical time assimilated into the account; heroes emerge 
along with the world, and individual and social change can shape each other (Morson & 
Emerson, 1990).  
 Tracing these gradual historical developments will not be our main concern. More 
germane here, while Bakhtin studied chronotopes in literary narrative he believed they 
were fundamentally important in human development more generally (Holquist, 2002; 
Morson & Emerson, 1990). In 1925, Bahktin attended a lecture by the Russian 
physiologist, A. A. Ukhtomsky, on chronotopes in the biological world. Different 
species, Ukhtomsky observed, were governed by different time-space patterns and 
rhythms. This was the source of the concept in Bahktin’s work. He was inspired in 
Ukhtomsky’s lecture by the links he perceived not only with applications to the 
expression of chronotopes in literature and in the human world more generally, but even 




(1981, p. 84) emphasised that the link to relativity theory was “almost, but not entirely” 
metaphorical, it remains important for sound dialogical reasons (Holquist, 2002). Not 
only did Einstein emphasise the fusion of time-space relations in the physical world, he 
showed that any object, including time itself, was the product of mediated experience; of 
dialogue. Holquist (2002) writes: 
For Einstein there is no chronology independent of events. The movement of a 
clock’s hand, if that movement is to be an event – if it is to mean anything to a 
human being perceiving it – must always be correlated with something happening 
outside the clock. An event, in other words, is always a dialogic unit in so far as it 
is a co-relation: something happens only when something else with which it can be 
compared reveals a change in time and space….As soon as co-being is recognized 
as an event’s necessary mode of existence we give up the right to anything that is 
immaculate [or] in-itself…(p. 116) 
 
Applying the idea of time-space mediation from physics to the realm of poetics, Bakhtin 
saw that the same principles apply in human experience. That is, time and space 
categories are always relative because they can only be known by comparison with some 
other set of coordinates that can serve as a system of reference. It is this inter-locking of 
time-space relations in the mediated experience of ‘events’ that provides the very 
grounds for the creation of human chronotopes. Different social activities suggest 
different kinds of fused time and space relations. For example, the rhythms and spatial 
organisation of the assembly line, agricultural labour, sexual intercourse, overseas travel, 
provincial life, and parlour conversation all differ markedly (Morson & Emerson, 1990). 
It follows that there must be a multiplicity of chronotopes, or a wide variety of 
“temporal-spatial world-views” existing at the same time and available for individuals to 
represent their experience and make their lives meaningful (Sampson, 1993).  
 
Personal Chronotopes in a Dialogical Self 
How can the literary concept of chronotope be aligned with dialogical self theory? As 




kinds of structures Bakhtin envisions in ‘artistic narratives’ and cultural-historical 
epochs, find parallel formations in personal chronotopes? One example, the chronotope 
of ‘the road’ or the path of a life in the adventure novel, invites clear parallels in the life 
narratives or life paths of individuals. The potential linkages, then, between literary, 
cultural, and personal chronotopes invite further theoretical work.  
 By its very definition, the chronotope melds extension in both time and space via 
processes of mediation. In the adventure novel, the road travelled is the semiotic 
mediator along which time and space ‘thicken’, or ‘take on flesh’. In personal 
chronotopes as well, the road can be read as both a literal and metaphoric (or symbolic) 
thread. But while the road suggests a kind of generic architectonics for genres of 
narrative at the socio-cultural level, at the psychological level we need to consider other 
forms of mediation. That is to say, while the road is a metaphor for spatial extension, the 
dialogical self, as was observed earlier, is also defined using spatial metaphors of 
extension ( i.e., in terms of ‘positions’ and ‘counter-positions’). Here I will argue that 
the personal chronotope can be thought of as having the properties of both simultaneity, 
in the form of positions and counter-positions in space, and historicity, in the form of a 
developmental unfolding or evolution of these positions over time.  
 
Thirdness and Mediation 
If the dialogical self is an amalgam of positions and counter-positions in time-space, the 
question remains as to how such formations uniquely emerge. In order to address this 
question I have found it useful to apply the thinking of the American pragmatist 
philosopher C. S. Peirce (1931-1958). For Peirce, most of what is important in human 
experience is mediated by what he called ‘thirdness” [see also Bradley (2010), Raggatt, 
(2010) for extended discussions]. In Peirce’s epistemology, mediation always involves a 




cold); a ‘Second’ that acts on a First, as, for example, when two people collide with one 
another on an icy street corner; and a ‘Third’, which Peirce called the ‘interpretant’ and 
which equates to cultural and semantic knowledge that mediates meaning in the relations 
of Firsts and Seconds. In Peirce’s original semiotic triad, an object (First) and its signifier 
(Second) are useless (meaningless) without cultural interpretants (Thirds). How can we 
apply this approach to the dialogical self?  
 One way would be to examine mediation between pairs of I-positions in relation to 
third term mediators that are structurally ambiguous. That is to say, such mediators 
conjoin but simultaneously differentiate positions and counter-positions. From this 
perspective Bakhtinian dialogism is entirely compatible with Peirce’s triadic 
epistemology. The Bakhtinian scholar Michael Holquist (2002) makes this link clear in 
the following set of remarks about Bakhtin’s theory of self. He writes: 
The self…is an event with a structure….[T]hat structure is organized around the 
categories of space and time. They articulate what has been called the “law of 
placement” in dialogism….Our places are different not only because our bodies 
occupy different positions…but also because we regard the world from different 
centres in cognitive time/space…Dialogism, like relativity [theory], takes it for 
granted that nothing can be perceived except against the perspective of something 
else: dialogism’s master assumption is that there is no figure without a 
ground…..This way of conceiving things is not, as it might first appear to be, one 
more binarism, for in addition to these poles, dialogism enlists the additional 
factors of situation and relation that make any specific instance of them more than 
a mere opposition of categories. (pp 21-22) 
 
….The self, then, may be conceived as a multiple phenomenon of essentially three 
elements (it is – at least – a triad, not a duality): a centre, a not-centre, and the 
relation between them. (p. 29) 
 
Here, the Peircean and Bakhtinean frameworks find common ground by enlisting 
mediation between oppositions. But it is a mediation born out of a simultaneous 
resemblance and difference. A contemporary of Bakhtin, the linguist Sergei Karcevskij 
noted that “true differentiation pre-supposes a simultaneous resemblance and difference” 




Roman god of transitions, they peer simultaneously at two conflicting positions. Holquist 
(2002) observes that “the self and the other exist not as separate entities but as relations 
between two coordinates…each serving to differentiate the other” (p. 26). Applying this 
principle to questions about mediation between I-positions yields a ‘dialogical triad’ of 
the form shown in Figure 1.  
***Figure 1 about here*** 
Here the basic constituent of the personal chronotope is a triad defined by an I-position, 
a counter I-position, and a third term ‘interpretant’ (Peirce, 1931-1958). The interpretant 
may be another person, an object, an event, or another position in the self. Its 
distinguishing feature is its structurally ambiguous signification. For example, if a 
spouse or partner creates continual conflict for you by being alternately accepting and 
rejecting, then decentralizing movements in the self may result. Here, the dialogical triad 
is comprised of two opposing I-positions (accepted self, rejected self) that are 
simultaneously polarized and attracted by an ambiguous third position, the spouse or 
partner that is alternately supportive and hostile. Hence, ‘ambiguous thirds’ provide one 
of the keys to understanding our multiplicity.  
 If we use dialogical triads to model simultaneity and spatial extension in the 
chronotope, temporal extension can then be captured in a succession of such triads, 
yielding a basic structure for the personal chronotope, as shown in Figure 2.  
***Figure 2 about here*** 
In this formulation, the personal chronotope is conceptualized as a plaited semiotic chain 
or ‘meaning thread’ comprised of multiple triads. The triads are defined by the same 
counter-posing I-positions and a sequence of ambiguous thirds. The personal chronotope 
invokes both centralizing and decentralizing movements. It integrates strands of meaning 
in the self, but is itself fundamentally dialogical and multi-voiced (there is no single 




work of the authors he studied, writing that: “Within the limits of a single work and 
within the total output of a single author we may notice a number of different 
chronotopes and complex interactions among them, specific to the given work or author” 
(p. 252).  In what follows, I will aim to illustrate precisely this pattern of emerging and 
interlocking chronotopes, distilled from the life history data of a single male participant 
at midlife. Chronotopes capture central developmental themes in the emergence of the 
dialogical self over time. 
 
Case Illustration: Chronotopes in the Case of Sean, a Recovered Addict 
In the remainder of this chapter I will describe a method for distilling chronotopes 
from life history data using the triadic formulation developed in the foregoing section. 
For this purpose I will use a case history about which I have written previously (Raggatt, 
2002). The aim here is to re-interpret keys aspects of the case material using the model 
for personal chronotopes depicted in Figure 2. In essence, the case material will be used 
to fill in the details of Figure 2, while at the same time, elaborating a model that contains 
multiple chronotopes.   
 
Method in Outline 
The method I use (called the Personality Web Protocol), assumes that important 
recurring I-positions and counter-positions have a narrative structure which can be 
identified. In essence, it is assumed that positions and counter-positions have their own 
internally coherent stories to tell. Hence I use a narrative approach to assessment of the 
dialogical self, examining positioning processes in written accounts, in quantitative 
assessments, and in in-depth interviews (see Raggatt, 2000, 2006, for detailed accounts 
of the methodology). During the assessment process participants are interviewed and 




to list and provide brief written descriptions for 24 life history constituents, including 6 
significant people, 6 life events, 8 objects and places, and 4 aspects of body image (liked 
and disliked body parts). Participants then sort these constituents into associated groups 
or clusters (typically, between two and six clusters are produced from 24 constituents). 
Finally, participants are asked to provide a self-relevant identifier or label for each cluster 
(e.g., artistic self, practical self). In this way, important positions and counter-positions 
are revealed, under the assumption that these positions are comprised of agglomerations 
of life history details. Using also a quantitative approach, participants are asked to rate 
their constituents, pair-wise, for similarities and differences using a 9 point scale. These 
ratings are used in multidimensional scaling analyses to reveal clusters of associated 
constituents. This quantitative data can be analysed and interpolated with the 
participants’ subjective sorts of constituents, and with their commentary on the life 
history material given in audio-taped interviews. Interviewing takes typically about two 
hours and may be conducted over two sessions. The interview focuses first on each 
individual constituent, exploring its meaning, before turning to an exploration of the 
constituent clusters and the I-positions they represent. Proceeding by this means, a series 
of narratives about each I-position crystallizes from an examination of the constituents 
making up each position (Raggatt, 2000, 2006).  
 
 Case Material: Synopsis of the Life of Sean 
To help contextualize the analysis which follows, I will begin by summarizing a 
previously published synopsis of the major events in Sean’s life (Raggatt, 2002). Sean is 
43 years old. He was born in Northern Ireland and immigrated to Australia with his 
working class family as a 10 year old. His father was a foundry worker who played 
soccer for Northern Ireland as a young man. But now Sean describes his father as “a 




repeatedly hospitalized throughout Sean’s childhood. Crucially, Sean remembers being 
“mothered” as a young boy by his sister who was 11 years older than him. When Sean 
was 7 years old, however, his sister secretly immigrated to Australia by herself. Sean 
describes being very traumatized by this event.  Three years later, the rest of the family 
also immigrated to Australia. Sean’s teenage years were marked by success on the sports 
field, but also by ongoing family trauma. At 18, Sean was left at home to care for his 
mother who was dying of cancer. He began at this time, to use both heroin and alcohol, 
and this lead to addiction, overdoses, and chronic alcoholism. For a time in his 20’s Sean 
was an outcaste from society. In his 30’s Sean joined Alcoholics Anonymous and formed 
a lasting relationship with a counselor. These decisions eventually helped bring about 
positive change in his life.  
 
 Sean’s I-Positions in the Personality Web Protocol 
When clustering his life history constituents, Sean identified I-positions that he called, in 
chronological order of their emergence, the “Good Guy”, the “Lost Boy”, the “Addict”, 
and the “Magician”. These positions emerged both in the qualitative sorts of 
constituents, and in the multidimensional scaling analyses using the quantitative 
proximity ratings (see Raggatt, 2002, for the details of the multidimensional scaling 
analysis).  
 A distinctive feature of the four positions described by Sean is their temporal 
organization. What begins as a simpler structure in childhood (at least, as described by 
Sean) defined by one position (the Good Guy), splits in later childhood, and then splits 
again in adolescence and in adulthood to form four positions. The positions are not just 
sequential, however; they are also simultaneous in Sean’s experience. As Sean describes 
them, each remains alive in his experience to the present time. Without this simultaneity, 




 First, I will focus on the initial formation of positions and counter-positions in 
Sean’s childhood experience (the Good Guy vs. the Lost Boy). A series of dialogical 
triads are formed using these two positions and ambiguous thirds drawn from the life 
history data. The model for the chronotope shown in Figure 2 is used to organize the 
data. This process is then repeated to describe the emergence of the Addict I-position 
(using dialogical triads involving the Lost Boy and the Addict), and finally the emergence 
of the Magician I-position (using dialogical triads involving the Addict and Magician). I 
propose that the layering of these triad strings (or meaning threads) reveals a cascading 
series of personal chronotopes. To lay out the terrain, the entire analysis is summarized 
in the ‘chronotopic chart’ shown in Figure 3. Note that the figure is an elaboration of the 
basic conceptual model for the chronotope shown in Figure 2. In what follows I will 
discuss in turn each of the three personal chronotopes shown in Figure 3.  
*** Figure 3 about here*** 
Chonotope 1: Good Guy – Lost Boy 
In the interview Sean tells me that the Good Guy and the Lost Boy are positions that he 
recognizes from childhood, but that they also remain important in his current life. Early 
in childhood the Good Guy was linked to his older sister as primary caregiver, and later, 
to his achievements in the sporting arena. As a young man Sean was an elite-level 
cricketer, playing in Australia’s national competition. But while Sean’s sister and his life 
as a cricketer are important for the Good Guy, at the same time these symbols of esteem 
are implicated in the emergence of the Lost Boy. As noted, when Sean was seven years 
old his sister secretly immigrated to Australia. About this experience Sean says, “My 
sister was my mother. It was the first great absence in my life.” Hence, as Sean tells it 
this traumatic event is the kernel for the emergence of the Lost Boy as counter to the 




with this interpretation, Sean included his sister twice as a constituent in the life history 
assessment procedure, i.e., in both his Good Guy and Lost Boy constituent clusters.  
 Looking now at the first row of triads in Figure 3, the sequence shows a 
hypothetical segment of Sean’s extended position repertoire for the chronotope of the 
Good Guy vs. Lost Boy. Temporal succession in the chronotope is specified by a chain 
of three dialogical triads. In childhood, Sean’s sister, who hitherto had been his surrogate 
mother, abandons him. This event is a kernel for decentralizing movements in Sean’s 
developing sense of selfhood. Sean’s father is a second ambiguous marker defining the 
chronotope (see Figure 3). The father had been a sports champion, but by the time Sean 
reached his teens the father had become an alcoholic. This is the same script that is 
recapitulated in Sean’s adult life, and so the father stands for both the Good Guy 
sportsman in Sean, and the Lost Boy who later succumbs to addiction. A significant 
event from adulthood completes the third triad shown in the first panel of Figure 3. In 
this event, Sean abandons his cricket team at an airport and goes on an alcoholic 
‘bender’, disappearing for three days. Here, the Good Guy and the Lost Boy are 
represented in the ambiguous symbol of the ‘star cricketer’, drunk, lost, abject and 
derelict.  
 
 Chronotope 2: Lost Boy – Addict  
The third I-position in Seans’s repertoire, the Addict, appears in adolescence as a 
dialogical response to the plight of the Lost Boy, and so these two positions define the 
development of a second chronotope in Sean, represented by the middle row of triads 
shown in Figure 3. When Sean was 18 his mother died of bowel cancer, an event that 
hastened the disintegration of the family. In Sean’s words: 
My sisters fell apart emotionally. My father fell apart emotionally.…So I took care 




was asleep. And that is when I started drinking and taking heroin. It was...emotional 
pain.…Early on I discovered the anaesthetic power of drugs. 
 
As Sean constructs it then, the Addict is a ‘reply’ to the abandonment of the Lost Boy. 
But for a decade, it became the dominant position in Sean’s world. Sean succumbed both 
to alcohol and heroin addictions. Horrifying narrative accounts of the Addict dominate 
the later period of this time in his life, culminating at the age of 31 in an episode which he 
labels “The Pariah of Dixon’s Creek” (see Figure 3). In this episode Sean goes on a six 
week ‘bender’ using ethyl alcohol while living alone in a country farmhouse.(see 
Raggatt, 2002).  
 The second row of triads in Figure 3 is formed using the ‘objects’ of Sean’s 
addictions as third-term mediators. Heroin provided a reprieve from the pain of 
experiencing his mother’s dying and eventual death (the Lost Boy). But it was also a 
danger to his own life through the possibility of overdose (the Addict). Similarly, alcohol 
signifies the abandonment of his first wife, as well as the ‘alternative’ life of the binging 
alcoholic, and the binge on ethyl alcohol was both the product of his isolation in the bush 
(the Lost Boy), and a turning point in his life of addiction (“I was just a madman in the 
bush”) (see Figure 3).  
 
Chronotope 3: Addict – Magician 
Sean describes the Magician as “a kind of spiritual self”. In the role of “savior”, it is the 
counter voice to the Addict. The Magician in Sean is the charmed survivor and great 
escapologist. But the Magician also tells stories of salvation and of “giving over ones will 
to higher (moral) powers". Some readers may recognize the source of Sean’s quote as 
the third step in the Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) abstinence program. While seeking 
treatment in hospital Sean befriended an AA support worker and subsequently attended 




 The final row of triads in Figure 3 are defined by mediators that are linked to Sean’s 
problems with addiction, but at the same time they signify Sean’s ‘escape’ from that 
addiction – the AA meetings, Sean’s addiction counselor (who became his second wife), 
and a beach house property, which signifies both inner-city escape (from drugs) and ‘sea-
change’ renewal. Just as the chronotopes of the Lost Boy and the Addict repeat themes 
of abandonment, isolation and anaesthesia, in the chronotope of the Magician there are 
recurring episodes that repeat and rework a fable of magical rescue. Sean’s second and 
present wife, for example, has been instrumental in facilitating a range of magical rescues 
– from addiction, from being lost or alone, from poverty.  
 While Sean now leads a relatively comfortable life (represented in the Good Guy and 
the Magician), he also has an ongoing history of lapses involving binge drinking (the 
most recent was only months prior to interview). Much to his partner’s dismay, he also 
occasionally disappears suddenly (like his sister) for days without warning or explanation 
(the Lost Boy).  These episodes are important from the perspective of simultaneity and 
decentering in Sean’s dialogical self. They reveal that positions with distant origins may 
re-emerge or be reactivated. 
 
Discussion 
The flowchart shown in Figure 3 attempts to portray the ‘landscape’ of the dialogical self 
as series of inter-locking threads in time–space, each thread taking the form of a 
chronotope (Bakhtin, 1981). The ambiguous thirds which complete the triads in each 
chronotope are the Janusian heads or fulcrums around which decentering movements in 
the self emerge and develop. For Sean, his sister and father are profoundly Janusian, 
occupying the space of both his most pleasant and unpleasant memories from childhood 
and adolescence. The chronotopes of the Addict and the Magician are similarly 




ambiguous thirds are doubled - the sister as both mother and betrayer; the father as both 
champion and drunkard; heroin and alcohol as both anaesthetic and addictive. It is these 
semiotic mediators that make visible the positioning dynamics at play in Sean’s temporal-
spatial world.  
 It is also worth observing here that in Sean’s chronotopes his I-positions occupy 
different physical as well as metaphorical spaces. The Good Guy is very social; he is still 
a member of his cricket club. He is a “raconteur” in these spaces. The Lost Boy, on the 
other hand, is always alone in space, whether abandoned or abandoning others. The 
Addict is a creature of inner city ‘zones’, while the Magician attends regular AA 
meetings at the same place, is a wizard in the kitchen, and an occasional puppeteer for 
school groups. Hence, each position takes up, relative to its neighbors, different physical 
as well as semiotic spaces in the chronotope.  
 It will be helpful here to summarize the Bakhtinian formulation of the chronotope 
in order to reflect on what the findings in the case of Sean might mean for human 
development. For this purpose I will refer to a useful summary provided previously by 
Morson & Emerson (1990, pp. 367-369) in their discussion of Bakhtin’s prosaics. Here, 
I adapt their main points: 
1. In the chronotope, time and space are not separable, but intrinsically 
connected. There is a fusion in the experience and rendering of time and space. 
Figure 3 is an attempt to distil such a fusion.  
2. There are a variety of senses of time-space fusion available. We live in a 
universe of ‘heterochrony’ or multi-temporality.  
3. Chronotopes are present not just in animal life, but in novels, and in narratives 




4. There is a multiplicity of chronotopes available to the person. These may 
change over time, and compete with one another. Chronotopes, therefore, have 
both historical and dialogical properties.  
5. Chronotopes are not so much ‘visibly present’ as they are the ground for 
making possible the representation of events in time-space.  
I interpret this last point to mean that chronotopes are difficult to ‘see’ because they 
emerge into view only in the mediation between I-positions performed by a third term: an 
other, object, or event with multi-stable meanings. In the chronotope, thirdness is alloyed 
to history in a thread of signifiers that destabilize the centre, and make the self (to use 
Bakhtin’s term) ‘unfinalizable’. In developmental terms, then, there is no ‘resting place’ 
for the self; no final solution. The individual is always emerging out of the objects and 
events that refract experience away from a quiescent centre. The result developmentally 
is a tendency towards greater differentiation (not integration) as we move from 
childhood to adolescence to adulthood. We see this clearly in the case of Sean. At the 
same time, however, the chronotope gives a form of stability (a centralizing tendency, 
not a unity) captured also in the mediating process – a fabric which organizes time-
spaces, while also multiplying them.  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that semiotic mediation is crucial to the dynamics of positioning processes 
in the dialogical self. From a developmental point-of-view, I have suggested that the 
concept of ‘thirdness’ provides an important tool for understanding the emergence of 
personal chronotopes in time-space (see also Raggatt, 2010). Ambiguous thirds reveal 
how chronotopes are built from semiotic relations. Using a case example, I have shown 
how this approach allows us to plot the formation of I-positions, counter-positions, and 
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Figure  2  Hypothetical structure of a personal chronotope   
 
